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
S E C R E T

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Forwarded herewith are two articles with translations concerning CIA activities around the world. Attachment 2 contains a strong rebuttal by Joergen SCHLEIMANN against the charges regarding the Congress for Cultural Freedom made in Attachment 1. SCHLEIMANN and Frank OSVALD, the author of Attachment 1, are not on speaking terms which undoubtedly contributed to the harshness of their exchange.


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Attachment:
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GROUP 1
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Information
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The CIA's Unrealistic Studies In the Field

Foreign Affairs, issued by the Council on Foreign Relations in New York four times a year, is the most distinguished of all American periodicals, that occupy themselves with foreign politics. The paper prefers state leaders, prominent persons with academic degrees, and public personalities as contributors. The editorial staff declare itself for independent of all political interests.

Thus the last edition of Foreign Affairs contains a Rhodesia article by President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, contributions by President Bourguiba of Tunisia and by the French Socialist president candidate, Gaston Defferre. The head article is titled "The Faceless Vietcong", and its writer is described as an independent Asia expert with an academic background, among whose works is mentioned a book about "Esthetics and the Problem of Importance".

What is not mentioned is the fact, that George A. Carver is a permanent employee with the Central Intelligence Agency. This fact throws a doubtful light over the article's claim that the South Vietnamese National Liberation Front is nothing but the North Vietnamese Communist Party's prolonged arm and tool in its fight for gaining control with the whole Vietnam. It does not surprise, that this extremely controversial claim expresses the CIA's opinion. It is also the opinion of the government, about which there at present is a bitter conflict between The White House and the Congress' foreign political committee, headed by Senator Fulbright. The above article is an open attempt to influence the American opinion, and therefore conflicts with the law, according to which the CIA's activity "lid" lies in the United States.

What happened with or without the government's approval in the affair reveals the lacking public control of the United States' unmanageable intelligence apparatus. Therefore Senator Fulbright and his colleague Eugene McCarthy have demanded a new search of the CIA's part in American foreign policy and that the Congress Committee should take over the control.

The New York Times' 25,000 Words

The latest CIA scandal comes at a time, when Washington's James Bond center, already is exposed to a wave of more and less serious publicity. The most weighty contribution is a series of articles of a total of 25,000 words in The New York Times which is the most satisfactory analysis since the book "The Invisible Government" was published a few years ago. Contrary to the book, the paper avoids the sensational information, giving a more balanced--and better documented--description of both the CIA's success and catastrophes than the bestseller from 1964. But also on a more popular level is the CIA good stuff again: thus the men's magazine, the Esquire, has revealed the names of the CIA's section chiefs held secret and their (often poor) qualifications.

The New York Times' five full-page articles tell mainly about the CIA's well-known achievements, from the action against Mossadeq in Iran in 1953 and the Guatemalan coup in 1954 (which the paper counts as successes) to the fatal Swine Bay invasion in 1961. However, the paper's reporters have worked more thoroughly than most of their predecessors and have examined a number of less noticed episodes. They are often characterized by an almost horrifying technical inventiveness combined with a complete misunderstanding of the intelligence service's assignments.

One CIA agent got hold of a Soviet chartered ship in Puerto Rico in August 1962. She carried Cuban sugar, which they impregnated with a bad tasting, but harmless, stuff to create a break between Moscow and Havana. This happened, while Khrushchev was busy installing rockets in Cuba. Kennedy luckily put a stop to the adventure.

When Singapore became independent, the CIA decided to take over the British MI-6 part as an espionage center. An expert was sent out to recruit agents, armed with the United States' secret weapon, a lie detector. However, when the expert switched on the apparatus, he burned all the fuses in the hotel and thus revealed himself. It was during the succeeding scandal that the CIA offered Singapore's Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, a bribe of 230 million kroner to forget the case.

Health Examinations

The New York Times' most surrealist example originates from Vienna, where CIA people "infiltrated" a clinic for overseas diplomats and statesmen. The agents performed their own medical examinations and collected specimens of urine from the prominent patients to get an insight in their health and chances of survival. Sukarno, Ibn Saud, and Indo-China's ex-emperor, Bao Dai, are said to have been subject to this treatment.

For the greatest part of the CIA's activity can be considered legitimate and effective, the paper claims. It thinks here of such achievements as the listening tunnel under West Berlin or the publication of Khrushchev's "secret talk" against Stalj in 1956. The doubts arise, when the CIA's political part overshadows the espionage, especially because it appears that a certain political line generally is followed, namely anti-Communism of the hard Goldwater kind.

In the dozens of "black" actions, during which the CIA installed presidents on the Philippine Islands, organized the Ngo family's private police in Saigon, and trained agents on Taiwan, the CIA's primitive, one-sided political judgment forms a peculiar contrast to its technical ability. The CIA cooperates hard with Latin American police for the suppression of "Ostroleft" students' organizations--but never with Spanish students against the Franco regime.

It is especially disturbing, that the methods often approach the methods known from the CIA's Soviet opponent, the KGB. According to The New York Times, as much as 75 per cent of the staff with some American embassies consist of intelligence people--they are easy to recognize, it is claimed, because they have the most money and the most elegant cars. Like the KGB, the CIA shows an irresistible desire to infiltrate everything and everybody, which does not only apply to such enterprises like Radio Free Europe in Munich, but also the police in Africa and western institutions forming opinion.

The Congress for Cultural Freedom

The paper makes a sensational statement to the effect that the CIA supported the liberal Congress for Cultural Freedom financially and also publications, such as the Encounter, which are connected with the Congress. After vigorous protests from prominent Americans, such as J. K. Galbraith and Arthur M. Schlesinger, the editors had to apologize. The New York Times gives no source for its accusation, which might be based on the fact that the Congress, which for some time was financed by the Ford Foundation, followed a peculiar left oriented and anti-Communist line, which often was close to American interests. Sometimes this was reflected in a lack of consequence. The Encounter and its sister publications, such as the French Revoltes and the German Der Monat, took up an intransigent attitude toward Castro but was sympathetic toward for example African one-party regimes and East Europe. After the Encounter has become independent it is also far more critical toward the United States' Vietnam policy.

On the whole, there is no doubt about the CIA's efforts to influence the American public opinion, which the scandal about the Foreign Affairs is only one example of. Information brought recently a report about the CIA's infiltration of the international aid and study program at the Michigan State University. Now the famous Massachusetts Institute of Technology has declared, that it no longer wants to receive financial support from the CIA, as this often leads to "misunderstandings".

The other day the CIA had to appear in an American case, when an Estonian refugee sued another Estonian for slander--the accused had namely thrown suspicion on him in Baltic exile circles as being a Soviet spy. It appeared that the defendant acted in his function as a CIA agent. He got five advocates at his disposal and was freed from witnessing. Although this concerned the violation of an American citizen's constitutional rights, the CIA's immunity was acknowledged.

The Monarch and the House Sparrow

Simultaneously with this test case there appeared another example of how the

CIA carries on its own foreign policy. A former RAF pilot, John Hawks, and a French count, called Henri Marin Francois de Marin de Montmarin, played in this adventure. They smuggled weapons and old bombers to Portugal in a contribution to the suppression of the liberty movement in Angola and Mozambique. Hawks was arrested by the Portuguese, but the CIA. He has demonstrated his ability to will through all customs and control organs by using his code word "Operation" and "though sparrow".

The New York Times' examination deals with the unsuccessful attempts at establishing effective control of the CIA. A total of 150 resolutions about this subject were made in the Congress. After the ^{Allen W. Dulles} Swine Bay affair the "charming and imaginative" absolute monarch was replaced by the oil billionaire, McCone, and later by Admiral William Raborn. The CIA and the other intelligence organs are supervised by the so-called "Group 54-12"--called so because it was formed in December 1954--consisting of prominent officials from the State Department and the defense and of the president's personal advisers in intelligence matters. A total of four Congress committees are taking care of the "public" control.

The Congress is still almost powerless, partly because it is told only what the CIA chief tells it, partly because of the reactionary seniority system, which reserves the committee posts for the eldest and most conservative members. The control problem, however, goes down deeper. Even under ideal circumstances a parliamentary control would conflict with the American principle that foreign politics is the president's personal competence; you cannot vote about underground actions.

An effective, administrative control has often been opposed by the president himself. How ever furious Kennedy was after the Cuban invasion, he nevertheless decided not to deprive the CIA of its right to underground actions, but only to reduce them to what was "plausibly deniable" activities.

From the outside it seems that the heart of the problem rather is the whole American opinion that the intelligence service is a large-scale industry.

The CIA was founded as an answer to the great Soviet espionage offensive in the forties and also at a time when the real threat already was over. Since then the CIA has actually had too little to do, too much money, and too much power.

Under the influence of this Parkinson's law the espionage center in Washington has developed surprisingly similar to the Soviet KGB to a reactionary, political group of power, which is equipped with executive rights and chases an imaginary threat. Under the Soviet dictatorship, it can be claimed, control is easier to maintain as the KGB already has the disposal of the authority, which the CIA tries to win under scandalous forms and mostly unsuccessfully.

It is an illusion to believe that the intelligence service in a democratic society automatically is inspired by the spirit of democracy. All secret organizations are autocratic -- they are insulated from the public debate and political life. And this "privileged" position outside the society attracts men who despise the democratic system. This applies probably to Mr. Nielsen as well as to the empire on the Potomac river. The difference is just the available means, men and possibilities.

The foreign political adventures are just one expression for the CIA's uncertainty about what to do with the 3.5 billion kroner per year. Another and possibly more serious problem is the CIA's appearance as a domestic political pressure group. There is no lack of forces in the United States which share the CIA's view on the surrounding world as a Communist plot and which will refer to meet the threat with the same methods. The official Vietnam hysteria in Washington has activated these tendencies. But the present American debate about the CIA shows, that they no longer are allowed to expand. The time of conspiracies is over in the United States.